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Against a regional record of negative per capita  Moreover, during the tecession,  private sOctor  firms
growth  after the world  recssion and  debt  crisis of  did not reduce  employment  as fast as output  declined
1982,  Brazil  stands  out as a model  for  a different  -choosing  instead  to stockpile  labor  and sacrifico
path. By effecdvely  failing  to adjust  Intemal  demand  profits. The indirect  effects  (the income  multiplier
to the dedine in external  funds,  Brazil  set records  in  efcts) appear  to have  been  strong  enough  to have
its region  in per capita  growth  and inflation  between  prevented  real incomes  in the informal  sector  (includ-
1982  and 1988.  ing agriculture)  from falling  relative  to the fomial
By choosing  an expansionary  fiscal  path,  Brazil  sector. When  private  formal  sector  output  increased
traded  growth  in the middle  years  of the decade  for  in 1983-86,  so did employmenL  If the government
inflation  and  a larger  debt  three years  later. Fox  and  'had not tried  to protect  the wages  of lowor-skilled
Morley  look  at the impact  of that xade-off  on povcey  private  sector  workers.  finns would  probably  not have
alleviation  in Brazil.  where  in 1987  rough,  IS  increased  employment,  but increased  profits.
million  people  lived  in households  belqw  the poverty  'Bazil can stabilize  and  return to  a sustainable
line. (In Latin  America,  only  Mexico  has  a  otal  growth  path in the 1990s,  contend  Pox and Morley,  if
population greater tan  the number of poor people in  all groups (including the poor) suffer a short-run loss.
Brazil.)  -his  loss would  be short-rn  only  if the stabilization  is
Macoonomic policy  affects  few  people  effecdve  within  a short  time  and  private  investors
directly. For most  poor households,  the labor  market  become  confident  enough  to invest  again. The
is the most imporitnt  source  of income,  as they  rarely  ultimate  result  should  be higher  employment  and
own  much  capital. So Fox  and Morley  focus  on the  earnings  fand  greater  government  ability  to increae
effect  Brazil's  policies  had on its labor  markeL  social  services  to the pmor.  A repeat  of the stabiliza-
Their  counterfactual  simulations  suggest  that  tion  failures  of 1986-89  offers  grim  prospects  for the
Brazil  could  have  dealt belttr with  rising  levels  of  poor.
povert in the 1980s  if it had been  able to  reach  In short,  prospects  for reducing  poverty  depend
political  agreement  on a reduced  levl of consumption  on what nmechanism  is chosen  to expand  the private
in either  1982-83  or 1985  (by  reducing  government  formal  sector. In the 1970s  and  again in 1984-85,
spending  or increasing  taxes  and thereby  reducing  output  growth  in this  sectr brought  both  formal
private  consumption).  sector  employment  growth  (higher  paying  jobs)  and
This  was  difficult,  as the loosening  of authoritar-  higher  icomes in the informal  sector  - more  so in
ian controls  gave  voice  and power  to now  groups,  the southn  part of the country,  where  formalization
bringing  a rush of pent-up  demand  for  consumption,  is greaterand  where  the private  sector  has  a greater
especially  government  sevices. Ironically,  the failure  share  of formal  sector  employment,  Successful
to exercise  restraint  in the  early and middle  years  of  stabilization,  adjustment,  and g8wth should  bnit
fte decade  comprised  growth  for the reg of the  the northeast  but will  probably  do so less  than in the
decade,  huring all groups.  south. And  stabilization  will be especially  difficult
Brazil's  wage  policies  in thc 1980s  sirongly  for major  cities  in the nontheast.  Rcducing  povcety  in
benefited  formal  soctor  workrs, especially  dynng  thc  this  arca will require  policies  that make  growth  more
recession.  In this Brazil's  experience  differs  sharply  efficient  atpmvwty reduction  (improving  the rate  of
from  many  other  countries  during  stabilization.  trickle-down).
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The difficultie" iost Latin American  countries  have experienced  in
returning  to sustainv-A  growth after the world recession and debt crisis of 1982 have
surprised  and frustrated many observers. Concern  is increasingly  expressed  about the
social costs of this period of recession  and adjustment,  especially  for the poorest sectors
of the population,  who benefitted  significantly  from the more rapid income  growth of the
previous decade.  Nowhere  is this concern  better placed than Brazil, with roughly  45
million  people living in households  below the poverty line in 1987.1 Against  the
regional  record of negative  per capita  growth, Brazil stands out as a model for a different
path.  By effectively  failing to adjust  internal  demanid  to the decline  in external funds,
Brazil set records with respect to its neighbors  in per capita  growth and inflation  between
1982-88  (Table 1). Brazil, by choosing  an expansionary  fiscal path, traded growth in the
middle years of the decade for inflation  and a larger debt three years later. This study
looks at the impact of that tradeoff  on poverty  alleviation  in Brazil.
Table 1:  Income growth  and Inflation.
Brazil and Latin Amrica  1982-88
Average Growth  of  Average  Yearly
GDP, per Capita  Inflation
Brazil  0.9  301.9
Latin America
except  Brazil  -1.4  149.8
Source: Cardoso and Dantas (1989)
Macroeconomic  policy (e.g monetary,  aggregate  expenditure,  and exchange
rate policy) affects few people direcdy. Instead, macroeconomic  policy operates  through
factor and product markets to affect the functional  distribution  of income, and through
the functional  distribution  affects  individual  income,  depending  on the ownership  of
factor incomes  among households. For most poor households,  the most important  source
lTo  put ha number  in perspective,  within  Latin  America,  only Mexico  has a total  population  greater
than  the  number  of poor  people  in Brazil.-2 -
of income is the lah r market, as poor households  rarely own much capital. Our
approach  to analyzing  the question  of the impact  of Brazil's macroeconomic  choices  on
the poor therefore focuses on the labor market outcomes  these policies stimulated. Our
framework  for analysis  is inspired by Modigliani  and Paddoa-Schioppa's  work on Italy in
the 1970s. 2 First, we divide production  into the formal  (modern) and informal sectors,
as macroeconomic  policy will affect each one of these sector differently. Within the
formal  sector, the problem to be analyzed  is how to achieve  consistency  among
competir,g  claims of the factors of production  and other components  of cost, all of which
have to add up to the total value of the formal  sector  product. Workers set target wages
businessmen  set their markups, and the government  makes these claims consistent  by the
inflation  rate that it chooses through  monetary  and fiscal  policy.  How the government
chooses  to finance its deficit--through  bond sales or money  creation-determines  both the
inflation  and interest rates, the latter having important  ne.ga*"'e  implications  on supply
through  working capital and investment. The formal sector solution  consistent  with the
demands  of workers, business, interest and other elements  of cost, determines  output and
employment  in the informal sector as a residual. As this sector  has very little capital,
the issue in the short run is simply how much income  is left to be divided among the
labor force which is crowded into this sector.'
Using this framework  we address  two sets of questions  in this study. In the
first section, we examine  the results of Brazil's macropolicies  in some depth, looking at
the quantitative  record in terms of the evolution  of macroeconomic  variables, output in
the formal and informal sectors, labor market  outcomes  (employment  and earnings), and
poverty. In the second section, we lootk  at the cost of Brazil's macroeconomic  choices o1
the '80s to prospects for growth and poverty  alleviation  in the '90s.  We accomplish  this
task by using a set of simulation  models  to elaborate  Brazil's macroeconomic  options for
the next decade, and derive the income  distribution  outcomes  of these choices.
Backdrop  to the Debt Crisis
During the previous decade, Brazilians  had become  accustomed  to both
high rates of economic  growth and significant  improvements  in living standards.  Between
1970  and 1979,  real income in Brazil grew a astonishing  6 percent per annum,  per
capita, the incidence  of poverty fell roughly  50 percent and the severity of poverty (the
Modigliani  and Paddoa-Schioppa,  (1978).
'This  approach  is formalized  beginning  on page 12.-3 -
poverty gap) fell by 25 percent (Fox, 1990).'  Although  the effects  of growth on poverty
were not uniform,  as the poverty reduction  over the decade was roughly two-thirds  in
urban areas compared  with 50 percent in rural areas, and roughly  70 percent in the
Southeast  compared  with just under 50 percent in the Northeast,  nevertheless,  Brazil's
record on poverty  alleviation  in the 1970s, even in the least affected  areas is the envy of
many countries. Concentration  of income, the perennial  black mark of the Brazilian
growth and development  record, does not seem to have improved  over the decade,' and
remains  an important  social issue in Brazil today.  However,  despite  having one of the
most unequal  income  distributions  in the world, recent analyses  demonstrate  that the
economic  growth of the 1970s  was accompanied  by significant  social mobility  (Morley,
1982; Pastore, 1989). These analyses  show that the poverty  reduction  was brought about
primarily through  an expansion  in employment  in the urban formal  sector, where average
wages were close to three times  wages in the rest of the economy  by the end of the
decade.  This growth in formal  sector employment  was heavily  concentrated  in t1he
Southeast,  providing  some explanation  for the difference  in the efficiency  of growth in
reducing poverty  between  geographical  areas noted above.
An important  characteristic  of the Brazilian  growth  performance  of the '70s
lies in the role of external debt.  Before the second  oil shock, Brazil's debt was one of
the largest in the world, and new lending was increasingly  needed  just to cover interest
obligations. Even if the fall in the price of oil in the early '80s had not ended the supply
Throughout  this paper, we measure  poverty  by household  income  per capita. Our poverty  line, constant
in real terms, is 1/4 of the 1980  minimum  wage, per capita. The empirical  basis for choosing  this
poverty  line is described  in Fox (1990). This income  level represents  a lower bound estimate  of the cost
of a basic needs  basket  of goods, and equals  roughly $200 per year (in 1985  dollars). It is roughly equal
to the average  poverty  line used by Fishlow  (1972)  and Fox (1982)  in their analyses  of 1960s. Other
estimates  using more complex  methodology  and expenditure  data from 1974/75  have found poverty  lines
50-100  percent  higher in metropolitan  areas between 1981-86  (Rocha  and Tolosa, 1989).  Fox (1982)
found, using 1970  data, that if the poverty  line is raised by 20 percent, the size of the poverty population
grows 50 percent, indicating  a strong sensitivity  of the absolute size of the poverty  population  to changes
in the poverty  line, implying  a large scope for measurement  error.  The trends reported in this paper are
so strong, however, that even if we have  understated  the absolute  size of the poverty  population,  we are
confident  of our estimates  of the trends.
'According  to CEPAL (1986), the Gini index, measuring  the distribution  of income  across households,
ended the decade in roughly  the same place or slightly  higher  than it began. Ideally, one would  want to
measure  the distribution  of income  per capita across  households,  as this is a better measure  of the
distribution  of welfare. However,  we have not seen this calculated. The distrlbution  of income across
earners, the most commonly  used measure  of income  distribution  even  though it does not measure  the
distribution  of economic  welfare as it relates to consumption  units, appears  to have worsened  (Bonelli
and Sedlacek,  1989).h -
-4-
of petrodollars  for recycling while rising real interest rates were increasingly  eroding
Brazil's debt service capacity, the Brazilian  growth  machine  would have faced serious
adjustment  problei.  in the '80s.  Thus, the combined  external shocks of 1982 which
have coma to be called the world debt crisis hit Brazil hard, requiring  demand  to be cut
by roughly 4 percent of GDP (the size of the foreign  inflows)  as well as effect the
transfer of the increased  interest costs Brazil was now facing.
Despite the severity  of the crisis Brazil faced by late 1982, most observers
believed  that Brazil, with its diverse economy  and relatively  rich resource base, would
eventually  return to a growth  path less dependent  on external savings. In 1983 World
Bank projections  estimated  that if Brazil were to effect the required adjustment,  a savings
rate of about 20-2S  percent of GDP was reqiuired  over the next five years (a marginal
rate of about 30 percent, as the same projections  envisaged  a return to growth after a
brief period of austerity). Compared  with the marginal  savings rates of 50-60 percent
required from Chile over the same period in order to meet the debt service burden,
Brazil was viewed then as the country which could be a model for the region in terms of
adjustment,  growth, and external transfer, with minimal tradeoffs bet-ween  the three
objectives.  What these projections  could not highlight,  which proved critical in Brazil's
failure to adjust, was that in the case of Brazil all the adjustment  had to take place in the
public sector (the owners of the debt, de facto or de jure), in order to avoid a large
public-private  transfer problem  and significant  crowding  out.  This adjustment  in the
public sector was to take place at the same time as the country was opening  up the
political  process to groups which had been disenfranchised  for 20 years.  Politicaly, the
task was to cut the size of the pie by about 25 percent  just as the group standing  in line
to get a piece was increasing  dramatically.
The Record of the 1980s
Brazilian  macroeconomic  policy in the '80s and its outcomes  can be divided
into three periods: (1) recession, 1981-83;  (2) recovery, 1984-85;  and (3) boom-bust,
1986-89. We briefly review the macroeconomic  policies  and outcomes  in each period;
the quantitative  record is summarized  in Table 2.'  During the first period, Brazil used
tight money policies, some fiscal restraint, and an active exchange  rate policy to lower
This  description  of  Brazil's  macroeconomic  policy  in the  80s  in drawn  from  various  World  Bank
Economic  reports. The  mos.  recent  report  released  to the  public  is World  Bank  (1987).-5-  7
demand  and squeeze  the resources out for the external transfer.'  The burden of
adjustment  fell primarily on the private sector, as government  savings  began to turn
negative  over the period with rising interest costs.  In an attempt  to control inflation  and
limit the burden of adjvlstment  on the poor, the government  also used a (formal  sector)
wage control  policy of "cascading' adjustment,  allowing  more than  ;I'  percent
indexation  of wages at lower wage levels, and less than 100  percent ince xation  at higher
wage levels." The result of these policies  was Brazil's deepest  recession in 15 years, a
40 percent fall in investment  and, by 1983, an annual transfer abroad of 4 percent of
GDP.
During the recovery period (1983-85)  Brazil began  easing up on interest
rates, and at the same time returning  to the levels of government  expenditure  on goods
and services, wages, and investment  that were realized  in the '70s, financed  by external
debt.  Unfortunately,  this source of financing  was unavailable,  and interest payments
continued  to grow unabatedly. So to finance  the deficit, the government  was forced  to
(a) sell more government  bonds, eventualy forcing  interest rates back up; and (b) print
money, leading  to an acceleration  of inflation. As the recession  left many privat; sector
firns  with excess capacity, the decline  in investment  which had occurred in the previous
period was not yet much of a constraint  on growth and the Brazilian  economy  responded
well to the fiscal stimulus. The policy of 'cascading' wage adjustments  was abandoned,
and a policy of exchange depreciation  kept the trade surplus  up even as internal  demand
began to excand, providing  Brazil with the foreign  exchange  to continue debt service
payments. The trick was to get the local currency  equivalent  of the trade surplus  into the
hands of the government  to meet the fiscal  burden of the debt, a feat which was proving
increasingly  difficult. Nonetheless,  Brazil achieved  a marginal  savings  rate well above
the requirements  of debt service  during this period, investment  began to recover, and,
except for the troubling  inflation, Brazil seemed  to be emerging  from tr  4lebt  crisis on a
3Bakers  path.
'Throughout  this  period,  imports  were  tightly  controlled  by  a system  of import  licensing  and  quantitaive
restraints.  Thus,  the  exchange  rate  was  used  primarily  as a tool  of  export  promotion.  Throughout  the
decade,  Brazil  was  able  to generate  the  trade  surpluses  required  with  small  changes  in the  real  exchange
rate. Unlike  other,  more  open  economics,  large  real  depreciations/devaluations  were  not  required  In
response  to the  external  shocks  of  the '8Qs,  and  exchage  rate  policy  played  a relatively  minor  role  in
stabilizationladjustment  progms.
'In practice,  the  cascading  policy  was  primarily  effective  in  the  public  secoor,  as major  private  sector  and
joint  public-private  companies  simply  corrected  for  this  policy  by paying  wage  supplements  of various
kinds  to their  staff  at the  higher  levels.  Other  types  of  wage  control  policies  in  Brazi  over  the  decade
have  generated  similar  results,  leading  to a plethora  of  different  types  of remuneration  other  than
wages"  in  the  Brazilian  formal  sector.TABL  2:  BRAZIL - MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS.  1980 - 1987
Recession  Recoverv  Boom and Bust
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
GDP Growth, F-actor  Cost  1.00  0.95  0.96  0.90  0.95  1.05  1.20  :  .16
Agriculture  I .00  1.08  1.08  1.07  1.11  1.22  1.12  1.28
Private  Formnal  1.00  0.V2  0.92  0.86  0.91  0.97  1.14  1.07
Total Fornal  1.00  0.93  0.94  0.87  0.91  0.99  1.16  1.10
Informal  1.00  0.92  0.99  0.95  1.15  1.32  1.62  1.51
GDP Growth, Market Prices  1.00  0.97  0.98  0.9S  1.01  1.09  1.18  1.21
Fiscal Policv Indicator,
(percent  of  .iOP)
Revenue  23.3  23.5  24.9  23.2  20.8  21.1  22.7  22.7
Interest  1.9  2.3  3.4  4.2  6.2  10.8  10.2  9.0
Govemment Saving  1.1  1.9  40.4  -1.4  -2.8  -8.0  -6.8  -6.1
Debt  n.a.  15.5  19.8  28.4  34.3  36.1  22.7  40.0
Inflation  (annual nde)-  91  101  97  151  210  235  149  225
Real Exchange  Rate**  1.00  0.92  0.92  1.18  1.21  1.2S  1.08  1.00
Real Interest  Rates
(working  capital)  -13.4  25.7  24.6  13.4  36.4  32.1  6.4  30.7
Implicit  Rate of Retum
Government  Debt
(ovemight market)  1.3  18.5  26.5  13.6  17.9  15.9  5.8  7.4
GDP Deflator, annual rate  of change.
**  Exchangc rate deflated  by cost of living (Brazil)  times US WPI; (increase = depreciation).
TABLE 28:  BRAZIL - SAVING  AND INVESTMENT  1980-87
Total
Recession Recovory  Boom  Bust  Period
Bas 1980  1980-83  1983-85  1985-86  1986-87  1980-87
GDP  12,626  -615  1,746.9  1,106.7  432.8  2,671
Change As a Sharo  of Changc GDP
Consumption  10,014  -34.9  46.3  96.7  92.0  77.2
Goveanent  1,139  -2.4  10.2  18.2  92.9  28.7
Private  8,875  -32.4  36.1  78.5  -0.9  48.5
Expors  1,121  47.2  24.7  -17.0  20.2  23.4
Imports  1,399  -72.7  1.6  22.0  6.9  9.8
Foreign Savings (M-F)  278  -120.0  -26.3  39.0  -27.1  -33.1
Dometic Savings (GDP-C)  2,612  -65.1  S3.7  3.3  8.0  22.8
Investment  2,890  -185.1  27.4  42.2  -19.1  -10.3
Sources: 2A:  National Accouds (FGV); Cnarios;  2B:  World Bantk  (1988)  Tables 1.3 and 1.4.-7
By the end of 1985,  the transfer  problem  was  becoming  acute. Inflation
was accelerating,  velocity  was  increasing,  and  financing  the  government  deficit  by
printing  inoney  was  becoming  more  and more  difficult. The  solution  had to be a
political  consensus  on reducing  government  consumption,  or increasing  revenues  to
effect  the transfer. Unfortunately,  the  instincts  of the newly  elected  officials  were not
in this direction. The opposition,  having  been  denied  access  to control  of the public
purse  for so long,  for the most  part sought  to extend  benefits  to their constituencies.
The establishment,  represented  politically  by the  President,  was  in no mood  to bear
the burden  of adjustment  either. This  political  stalemate  characteizes  Brazil
macroeconomic  policies  in the later  half  of the  decade,  the  outcome  of which  has been
a period  of growth  (1986)  followed  by recession  (1987-88),  followed  by a growth
spurt  again  (1989),  with inflation  held  in check  only  through  increasingly  unsuccessful
wage  and price  control  programs  inaugurated  roughly  once  every  18 months,  and  with
private investment  crowded out.
The first and most famous  of Brazil's stabilization  plans was the Cruzado
Plan, initiated  in Februar  1986. The  key  elements  of this  program  included:  (a) real
wage  increases,  to pacify  organized  labor;  (2) a monetary  reform  and  price freeze;  (3)
a government-imposed  deindexation  of the economy,  including  financial  instruments
and the exchange  rate; and (4) an exchange  rate freeze,  (which  implied  an
appreciation)  and  a more open  import  policy  to ease shortages.  All of these  measures
increased  real purchasing  power  in the short  run, increasing  aggregate  demand. At
the same  time,  the government  failed  to take the  required  action  to curb  government
consumption,  despite  the breathing  room  that  the temporarily  lower  inflation  brought
in terms  of interest  savings  and  seniorage  gains,  and the  reverse  Tanzi  effect  brought
in terms  of increased  tax collections.  On  the contrary,  fiscal  pressures  were
aggravated  by the failure  to increase  publik  sector  prices  prior to the freeze  and by the
real wage  increases  granted  to government  workers  as part  of the  package. The
disequilibrium  in the balance  of supply  and  demand  became  evident  by July 1986;
shortages  developed,  inflation  returned,  and  the  plan collapsed.  In addition,  as
reserves  had  been  used  up by the import  buying  spree  of the appreciated  exchange  rate
stimulated  (and  government  import  policy  facilitated),  a debt  moratorium  was  finally
imposed  in 1987.
Brazil  has undertaken  two more  shock  stabilization  programs  since  the
ill-fated  Cruzado  Plan. While  both  appear  to have  averted  hyperinflation,  a constant
threat to Brazil  as inflation  begins  to accelerate  with  each  recovery  in private
aggregate  demand,  neither  program  has reversed  the negative  trend  in government
savings  for more  than  a month  or two. At the same  time,  a new  foreign  debt-8-
agreement  with  commercial  banks  in 1988  led to renewed  savings  outflows. With  th
debt service  outflow  and the  government  financing  needs  eating  up savings,  the private
investment  remained  stagnant  after  a short  burst  during  the Cmzado  Plan.
The  quantitative  results  of the tradeoff  Brazil  made  in later  half  of the
'8Os  - less adjustment,  more  growth,  debt  and inflation  - are summarzed  in the last
column  of Table  2B. On the positive  side,  Brazil  managed  to increase  domestic
income  by about  16 percent  over  the level  at the beginning  of the decade  and  to meet
the savings  targets  required  to continue  servicing  the foreign  debt, moving  quickly
from  a trade deficit  position  in 1980  to a surplus  pcsition  in 1982,  a position  which
was  maintained  throughout  the period  except  during  the  Crumado  boom  X  1986.
Consumption  also increased  over  the  period,  both  private  and public  and  aldiough
public  consumption  increased  almost  50 percent  faster  than  private,  this  consumption
increase  did help  to protect  living  standards.  However,  for the period  as a whole,  the
increased  debt service  was  greater  than  the i.rease  in dom-stic  savings,  and thus  the
level  of investment  fell sharply. The  increa^ing  unwillingness  of the private  sector  to
finance  government  consumption  (including  debt  service  payments)  has led to an
inflation  level of above  50 percent  per month  by the end of 1989. The crowding  out
of investment  in the '80s can  be expected  to compromise  Brazil's  growth  prospects  for
the '90s.
Poerty  in the '80s
The impact  of Brazil's  macroeconomic  policies  on the poor  and on the
incidence  of poverty  is transmitted  primarily  through  income  flows  into  poor
households.  In contrast  with  non-poor  households,  poor  households  tend to be (a)
larger, (b) have  fewer  earners,  and  (c) consequently,  a higher  dependency  ratio. In
1985,  the head  of household  contributed  over  90 percent  of household  income  in
roughly  3/4 of poor households.  This  ratio holds  irrespective  of region  (urban  or
rural), indicating  that  does  not simply  represent  the correlation  of poverty  with
agricultural  sector  activities,  where  unpaid  family  labor  is common.  In non-poor
households,  only  47 percent  relied  on the  head  for over 90 percent  of household
income. Heads  of poor  households  tend  to be slightly  younger  than  their  non-poor
counterparts,  and much  less  educated. In 1980,  59 percent  of heads  of poor
households  were  completely  without  any formal  education,  compared  to only  25
percent  of heads  of non-poor  households.
While  most  of the  poor throughout  Brazil,  uwban  and  rural, live  in
households  where  the head  is not employed  in the formal  sector,  in the large  cities  of
the Southeast,  poor households  do de.pend  on formal  sector  earnings  from  the head.-9 .
(Table  3)  Two thirds of the population  in non-poor  households  have heads worldng  in
the formal sector, where average earnings  are roughlt'  three times informal sector
(including  agdcultural sector) earnings. (See Table 5, below) Most heads of poor
families  are self-employed  or sharecroppers,  eaning income in the agricultural  or
teriary  sectors, although  in urban areas, heads of poor households  are also found in
significant  numbers  in manufkactuing  and construction.
ITl  3:  BRAZIL  - OCCUPATIONAL  CHARACTETICS  OF HEADS  OP POOR
HOUSEHOLDS,  SELECTED  AREAS  (1985)
(Pece  of Poor Populaton  in Household)
Udbn  Utbau  Runal  Rural
Characteristo  of Head  Brwazil  Nohueat  Southea  NoIeA  Southa
TeohiealVAdmdisntie  4.4  5.2  6.8  2.7  3.1
Agriculture  & Mining  39.2  27.6  13.6  85.9  84.9
Marzfacurng &
Consuction  10.3  25.8  33.2  5.5  5.1
Commce  A Rlatd
Activies  8.6  12.1  6.7  1.7  .8
Transport  &
Communwicatons  4.6  4.3  5.7  .9  .6
.Servioes  22.4  6.9  12.8  .7  2.6
Others  13.3  18.2  19.5  2.6  3.0
Formal  Sector  Employment  17.7  31.8  50.1  5.5  10.9
Mcmo  Item: Shae  of the Poor  100.0  20.2  172  33.8  10.2
Source: See r  ppendix
An important  characteristic  of Brazilian  labor markets  in the '80s is the
increasing  integration  of rural and urban markets. Thus, for example, 25 percent of
the heads of poor households  in urban Southeast  work in primary  sector activities,  and
15 percent of heads of poor households  in the rural Southeast  do not work in
agriculture. The agricultural  labor force has become  increasing  proletarianized  over
the decade as well; by 1987 over 50 percent of those earning  income in agriculture
were employees  (even in the Northeast, the comparable  figure is 48 percent).
Roughly one fifth of agricultural  employees  nationwide  have signed  labor cards
(formal sector  employment),  but this ratio also varies significandy  by region, with the
level of formalization  in the South twice  that of the Northeast. While most earners in
poor households  are at the bottom of the earnings  distribution,  not all low earners
belong to poor households. In 1985,  roughly  40 percent of those earning at the- 10 -
minimum  wage in the formal sector were secondary  earners  in households  with per
capita  incomes  in the top 40 percent of the distribution  (Alemeida  Reis, 1989).
Brazil's poverty record for 1981-87  was ambiguous,  although  definitely
not stronigly  negative  (Table  4).9 The recession  clearly hurt the poor but by 1985,
mean hoisehold incomes  ' id risen to 8 percent above  their 1981  level, bringing  the
level and intensity of poverty back to its 1981 trough. The Cruzado  Plan appeared  to
substantially  increase the incomes  of the poor.  It should  be noted, however, that this
dramatic  decline must be at least partially  a result of our use of a price index which
inadequately  measures real purchasing  power during this period as the price freeze
generated  significant  shortages  of key items in the consumption  basket of the poor.
Our scepticism  about the 1986 numbers is strengthened  by the complete  reversal  in
1987, as inflation  accelerated,  the economy  moved  back into recession,  and the
purchasing  power of the poor slipped  back to 1985  levels.
Given such a poor economic  growth  record, it is somewhat  surprising
that any poverty reduction  at all was recorded.  Part of the answer  to this puzzle is
shown  by the difference  between  the growth of GDP per capita and mean  household
income. For household  income to rise twice as fast as per capita GDP is unusual;  it
did not occur during the previous  decade (Fox, 1990). Most of the divergence
occurred  between 1983 and 1985. There are several  possible  explanations  for this
trend.  First, it is possible that the survey coverage  improved  (e.g. more income was
recorded in the later survey than in the earlier surveys). This did not happen.
Comparison  of the nominal  value of survey income  with GDP in 1981 and in 1987
shows that survey coverage  actually  declined  from 46 percent in 1981  to 45 percent in
1987. A second explanation  is that part of the sharp divergence  represents  differences
in the speed of change  of relative prices during a period of high and accelerating
inflation. The GDP numbers  are deflated by the implicit  GDP deflator, while the
household  income numbers are deflated by our low income  cost of living index.  This
does appear to be the case.  The accumulated  inflation  over the period 1981-1987
9Measuring  changes  in real  variables  is extremely  difficult  in Brazil's  high  inflation  environment.
Depending  on the deflator  chosen,  real  average  wages  in the Sao  Paulo  manufacturing  sector  between
1980  and 1988  (1) increased  by 50 percent  -using  the  PIPE  Sao  Paulo  cost  of living  index;  (2)  decreased
by 15  percent  - using  the FGV  broad  cost  of living  index;  or (3)  increased  by 9 percent-  using  the IBGE
narrow  cost  of living  index  (INPC). Similar  shifts  could  be recorded  for the population  in poverty. For
purposes  of deflating  real  wages  and  poverty  concepts  in this  paper,  we used  index  (3),  as the basket  of
goods  used  to calculate  this  index  better  approximates  the consumption  basket  of the poor,  and  it is a
national  index. It does,  however,  have  a strong  urban  bias,  as does  our data,  which  are from  the
national  labor  force  survey. This source  tends  to underestimate  rural  incomes,  but it does  so consistently
over  the period.recorded by the INPC (1981 =  100) was 36,931, while the implicit  GDP deflator  for
the same period recorded  39,069.  How much of this difference  is simply "noise" and
how much real gains in the relative price of consumption  goods  bought  by lower
income households  compared  with prices in the rest of the economy  (that is, a real
gain in purchasing  power for lower income  households)  is impossible  to tell.
Although  the percent of the population  in poverty was roughly constant
over the period, the share of household  income received  by the poor (as measured  by
the survey data) declined. Between 1983  and 1985,  the gain in average  income of the
poor offset the negative  distributional  movement,  but during the Cruzado  Plan and its
aftermath  this was not true, as the income gap ratio widened.' 0 The poorest 10
percent of the population  benefitted  the least from the income growth over the period.
The mean income of this group actually  dropped 3 percent between 1985 and 1987
while the population  average  grew 7 percent during the'  same period."
Regionally,  the Northeast (27 percent of the population  but 50 percent of
the poverty population  at the beginning  of the decade)  continued  to increase  its share
of the poor, although  the incidence of poverty increased  proportionately  more in the
South and Southeast  between 1981  and 1985, and in urban areas, where the bulk of
the population  resides.  Despite  the fact that the incidence  of poverty in urban areas
was the same at the beginning  of the decade as at the end, the urbanization  process
was strong enough to bring the number of urban poor in 1987 almost  equal to the
number of rural poor for the first time in Brazil's history.
'*ne Income  gap  ratio measures  the average  distance  of the household  income  of the  poor  from  the
poverty  line, and  thus  is a measure  of the severity  of poverty.  The poverty gap Index  is the income  gap
normalized  by the population  size. This  normalization  renders  the measure  distributionally  neutral  (see
Datt  and Ravallion,  1990,  for further  discussion).
'llhese numbers  are not  shown  in Table  4 but were  computed  by the author  from  the income  distribution
data.-12-
TABLE 4:  BRAZIL - POVERTY AND DISTRIBUTION INDICATORS
1981 - 1987
1981  1983  12!!8  18  18  1987
Povcrtv ndicators
Incidence of Poverty by Location  Share of Poor
Brazil  24.8  30.9  25.4  16.1  23.3  100.0  100.0
Urban  14.9  21.6  17.1  9.4  14.8  42.5  46.4
Rural  46.8  54.2  47.1  33.7  46.3  57.5  53.6
North  18.0  24.8  18.0  10.9  16.8  2.0  2.3
Notheast  44.9  52.5  46.3  32.9  44.2  S4.2  55.7
Urban  31.1  40.2  32.0  21.6  31.4  19.8  22.0
Rural  60.5  66.8  63.3  46.2  60.1  34.4  33.7
Southeast  13.5  19.4  15.5  8.2  13.0  24.3  24.9
Urban  9.3  15.0  11.4  5.4  9.2  14.1  15.1
Rural  36.6  43.8  39.1  23.5  34.2  10.3  9.8
South  16.6  25.1  17.4  10.8  17.3  10.9  11.6
Urban  9.0  16.6  11.7  5.9  10.1  3.6  4.5
Rural  28.9  39.4  27.8  20.2  31.6  7.2  7.1
Center/West  23.1  28.1  20.9  10.4  18.5  6.2  5.5
Income Gao Ratio  38.1  40.7  37.7  n.a.  39.0
Poverty Gap hInde  10.1  13.1  9.9  n.a.  9.5
Index of GDP Per Capita  1.0  0.93  1.01  n.a.  1.08
Index of Mean Household
Income'Per Cavft  1.0  0.88  1.08  n.a.  1.16
Distribution  of Income  Per CaniIdexofRo
Indcx  of Rcal
Shrc  f Pomution  Share of Income  Mean Incomo
- 10  0.88  0.86  0.85  n.a.  0.76  1.0  1.06
- 25  3.86  3.70  3.66  n.a.  3.45  1.0  1.10
- 50  13.21  12.63  12.57  n.a.  12.29  1.0  1.15
*  25  68.38  69.46  69.49  n.a.  69.60  1.0  1.25
F 10  46.17  47.01  47.36  n.a.  47.52  1.0  1.26
Constant poverty line of  1/4 1980 muinimum  salary per capita.  Deflator.  INPC.  Source:  See Appedix.
Analysis  of the 1980s
Brazil's  macroeconomic  policies  of the 1980s  produced  modest  growth  in per
capita  income,  external  balance,  and  high  inflation. Except  for the recession,  they  were  also
somewhat  successful  in maintaining  the  incomes  of the poorest  one quarter  of the population.
We now turn  to the analysis  of the impact  of the macroeconomic  policy on formal,
informal,' 2 and  agricultural  sector  earnings  and  employment,  seeking  explanations  from
these  factor  market  outcomes  for this  result. Table  5 presents  the detail  of the  labor  market
outcomes,  as we have  been able  to piece them  together,  and  Tables  6-9 summarize  the
'2Note  that  our definition  of the informal  sector  Includes  agriculture.  Where  we could  separate  out
agriculture  in trms of output,  employment  and  earnings,  we have  done  so.- 13 -
changes  in these indicators,  the sectoral  output  indicators  from Table 1, and the poverty
incidence  from Table 3 over the three macropolicy  periods  discussed  above.
Table  5:  BRAZIL - INDICES OF LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES.  1980-1987
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Emolovment Growth
Total  1.00  1.01  1.06  1.04  1.12  1.18  1.22  1.27
Agriculture  1.00  0.96  1.02  0.95  1.08  1.10  1.02  1.01
Formal  1.00  1.01  1.03  1.01  1.03  1.11  1.21  1.25
Informal  1.00  1.05  1.22  1.27  1.38  1.49  1.54  1.69
Private Formal
Sector+  1.00  0.95  0.95  0.89  0.92  0.98  1.02  n.a.
Public Scctor+  1.00  1.06  1.12  1.16  1.25  1.32  1.43  n.a.
Open Unemplovymnt (PME.  %)
Sao Paulo  7.2  7.2  5.5  6.8  6.8  5.0  3.4  3.8
Average, 6 citia  6.3  6.7  7.1  5.2  3.6  3.7
Real  WageS
Private Industry
(Sao Paulo,  FIESP)  1.00  1.07  1.14  1.06  0.99  1.05  1.17  1.08
Total Formal  Sector+  1.00  1.01  1.07  0.92  0.87  0.98  1.05  n.a.
Gov't Sector+  1.00  0.97  1.03  0.86  0.78  0.99  1.16  n.a.
Minimum Wage  1.00  0.99  1.01  0.91  0.83  0.86  0.89  0.73
Real Average Incomes**
Formal  1.00-  0.86  1.31  0.97  0.89  1.08  1.34  1.09
Informal  1.00*  0.85  1.30  0.9_  1.03  1.20  1.65  1.24
Agriculture  1.00'  0.84  0.96  0.77  0.78  0.84  1.16  0.83
Income  Diffcefniak
Formal/informal  3.08'  3.10  3.11  3.25  2.66  2.76  2.50  2.71
Informal/Agriculture  0.63*  0.64  0.86  0.75  0.84  0.90  0.90  0.94
* 1979  +  RAIS daLa *-  Avcage  eamings,  not corrected for  hours worked,  main occupation.
Note:  Informal Sector includes Agriculture,  and is defned  as labor fore  paiticipants not conOibuting to the social security  system
Source:  See Data Appendix.  Deflator:  INPC.- 14 -
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During the recessionary  period, the formal sector gained slightly at the
expense of the informal sector, while the big loser appears to have been agriculture,
where roughly 29 percent of the labor force was employed in 1982.13 Two
government policies appeared to have facilitated this result:  (a) the policy of
guaranteed six monthly over-indexation for formal sector workers in lower earnings
categories; and (b) a generous government employment policy which kept workers
employed in the formal sector, reducing the pressure on wages in the informal sector.
Private sector employers shed some workers in response to falling demand, but there
clearly was some labor stockpiling as well given the extent of the fall in output.
Government increased employment over the period, however, such that total formal
sector employment did not decline.  On the wage side, the evidence is somewhat
ambiguous.  The minimum wage fell by 10 percent, but industrial real wages
increased.  As a result there was a large increase in the share of factor income going
to labor and an equally large shrinkage in the share of non-financial profits.  Within
the government sector, the employment increase was accompanied by significant real
wage compression, causing average wages in the formal sector as a whole to fall.
Given that overall employment in the formal sector was stagnant, and that in
agriculture was shrinking, all the increase in the labor force during the recession was
absorbed by the infonnal sector, where average value-added per worker fell by one
fourth.  Reflecting this surge in employment (as well as the decline in agricultural
incomes) informal sector earnings fell by 8 percent between 1979 and 1983.
Somewhat surprisingly, the differential between the formal and informal sector
incomes remained roughly constant, increasing by only 5 percent for the period.
"During this period, the Northeast  suffered a major drought. Although  agriculture  output increased  overall,
earnings  in agriculture  must  have  been  affected  by the drought  conditions,  which  lasted  through  the 1982
harvest.a&LE 6:  BRAZIL  - EVOLUTION  OP  XEY  VARLABLES:  RECESSION  (1980-83)
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At the upper end of the income  spectrum,  profits, especially  non-
financial  profits contracted  sharply, as owners  of physical  capital  were hurt by the
combination  of high interest rates, workers' ability  to protect their wages, and
sluggish  demand. In short, the government's  tight money policy, combined  with a
wage policy which maintained  real wages, in effect  protected the middle of the earned
income distribution  against  both ends. However, the protection  of the middle clearly
benefitted  the urban informal sector as well by helping  to cushion  demand  for their
services, so the policy was not strongly  anti-poor." 4 Nonetheless,  the fall in incomes
in the agricultural  sector, where the majority  of the poor earn their incomes, combined
with the crowding  of the new entrants  into the informal  sector, where average
earnings  are one-third  of those in the formal  sector, clearly pushed  a significant
portion of the population  back into poverty, especially  in the urban areas in the South
and Southeast,  where most of the urban population  is located.
During the recovery period, formal  sector holders of capital  and
informal (including  agricultural)  workers  improved  their position, at the expense of
existing  private formal sector workers. During  this period, the formal-informal
earnings  differential  fell.  Public employment  continued  to swell while private sector
employment  kept pace with output growth. In addition,  in 1984, when inflation  took a
sharp  jump upwards, formal sector workers appear  to have been left behind. These
income losses led workers to demand  (and receive  in some sectors)  a halving of the
indexation  period in 1985.  Although  private sector workers did not gain over the
tMhe  simulation  exercise  below confirms  this result.- 16-
period,  government  workers  began  to recover  wages  lost  during  the  previous  period.
The increase  in informal  sector  incomes  combined  with  the  increase  in formal  sector
employment  (which  automatically  raises average  wages  in the economy  as the formal
sector  is the  high wage  sector),  brought  a significant  decrease  in urban  poverty  and in
poverty  overall. In this  period,  growth  did trickle  down  to the poor, reversing  the
adverse  effects  of the  previous  period.
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The Cruzado  Plan  in 1986  resulted  in a short-run  gain for all groups
which  was unsustainable.  Interest  rates  went  down,  while  profits  and consumption
increased  and  prices  went  down,  resulting  in real  income  increases  across  the board.
Employment  went  up, especially  in the higher  earnings  formal  sector. As labor
markets  tightened,  the earnings  differential  between  the  formal  and  informal  sector
narrowed  further,  and  the increased  demand  relative  to the supply  of labor  sharply
increased  real  earnings  in the informal  sector. Agriculual incomes  also took  a jump,
as employment  dropped  in response  to the urban  boom. These  real income  gains  were
felt immediately  by the poor, as poverty  dropped  below  pre-crisis  levels.- 17 -
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Unfortunately,  the boom of the Cruzado  period was not sustainable,  and
in 1987 inflation  returned as the government  tried to get the private sector to finance
the fiscal stimulus. As prices went up, incomes  came back down, both in terms of
labor earnings  and profits.  The acceleration  in inflation  clearly hurt labor incomes,
especially  in the less organized  parts of the formal sector where average  earnings  fell
almost  20 percent. Informal sector earnings  also dropped (back to 1985  levels), and
the incidence  of poverty fell back to the 1985  level.
While it would appear  that from a poverty perspective,  the boom and
bust of the Cruzado  was neutral, in fact, the recession  following  the Cruzado  plan
lasted through 1988. Preliminary  tabulations  of the 1988  data show a real earnings
decline  in both the formal  and informal  sectors, and an increase  in poverty, back to
1985 levels.  More importantly,  the absolute  income gap of the poorest also widened
as their real incomes  dropped over the period kTable  4), indicating  that for the poorest
of the poor, the boom and bust was not neutral. In addition,  the excesses  of the
Cruzado plan worsened  the stabilization  and adjustment  problem for the future by
adding to the debt burden.  If Brazil had actually  stabilized  in 1986  allowing  a return
to sustained  economic  growth (and the size of the imbalances  shown  in Table 2 are not
so great as to render this possibility  absurd), then the poor might have realized  strong
income gains by the end of the decade. As we will see in the next section, the longer
the stabilization  and adjustment  is postponed,  the worse off the poor become.- 18-
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Surveying  the  seven  year period  as a whole  from  a poverty  alleviation
perspective,  Brazil's  macroeconomic  policies  did  not help the poor.  But given
Brazil's  lackluster  growth  performance  (although better  than  most  countries  in the
hemisphere),  the  indifferent  poverty  performance  is actually  a bit surprising.  As we
noted above,  the difficulty  of measuring  changes in real  variables  as inflation
accelerated  does  not allow  us to  confidently  state that  the incomes  of the poor  did  not
go down  significant  over  the period,  but we can be reasonably  sure that  the incidence
and  intensity  of poverty  did  not worsen  very  much after  1983.  The  main reason
appears to  be the protection  of formal  sector wage  incomes  during  the recession,  and
the expansionist  fiscal  policies  in the post-recession  period.  As Graph  1 shows,  in the
80s (as in the 70s),  ptivate  formal  sector output growth  was strongly  related  to
poverty  reduction.  The  major  factor  keeping  the economy  afloat  was government
consumption,  a  significant  portion  of which  was public  employment.  This  fiscal
stimulus  helped  mr,aintain  employment  and  stimulate  some  real  output  growth.  The
income  growth  appears  to have  trickled  down to the poor  most  rapidly  in  1984-85,
when  formal  sector  output  also  expanded  rapidly.  During  the  1986-87  period,  the
poor  were  not  as fortunate,  as negative  distributional  shifts  overwhelmed  overall
income  growth  to worsen  the average  incomes  of the poorest  10 percent.- 19  -
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lhe expansiorist  fiscal  policies  thiroughout  the  later half  of thie  decade which  kept  the economy  afloat  were  not distributionally  neutral. Furternore,  there are likely  to be high  costs  to the X.  policies  in the future. The  public  sector  deficit absorbed  a large share  of privat; sector  savings,  crowding  out the private  sector investment  needed  for more accelerated  growth  and  labor  productivity  improvements in the 1990s. The  high  interest  rates  thie  government  paid on its internal  debt represented  a significant  and regressive  income  transfer  as the  share  of national income  going  to debt  service  rose to 10 percent  of GDP  by thie  middle  of the decade. The  household  survey  data used  in this  analysis  does  a very  poor  job of recording capital  income,  and  thus the effect  of this  transfer  on the  distribution  of income  is not well  captured  by this data. Nonetheless,  the size  of this  transfer  to ho.ders  of government  bonds  may have  been  a factor  in the  worsening  of Brwl's  already unequal  income  distribution  registered  over  the  peniod.
Modeins the  Effects  of lIDwila  Mco-ongMic  Polisi  sn IncQmles
From  the above  analysis,  it is clear  that thie  ultimate  answer  to the question  posed  at the  beginning  of the  paper-who  paid  the bill for Brazil's external debt  policies  of the '70sonly  will  be known  in the '90s because  one  of the important results  of Brazil's  macroeconomic  policies  of the '80s has been  the capitaization  of-20 -
that bill into domestic  debt.  Our conclusion  from the analysis of the '80s is that
Brazil now faces, in essence, the same tradeoffs  faced  in 1981  and in 1985, but with
fewer degrees of freedom, as the stock of capital  is lower and the stock of debt
higher.  In this section, we seek to complete  our analysis  of this question  by analyzing
the impact of some of Brazil's policy choices  for the '90s on the poor.  This is done
by constructing  a model to project the effect of alternative  stabilization  strategies  in
1988-1995  on incomes  in the formal  and informal  sectors.  The model also gives new
insights  about the impact of Brazil's alternative  policy choices in the 1980s  on
employment  and poverty." 5
The model we have chosen  is a simple  extension  of one originally
presented  by Modigliani  and Paddoa-Schioppa  (1978)  (M-PS). They built model to
examine  the effect of various sorts of indexing  arrangements  orn  anti-inflation  policy in
Italy, a good starting  point for a Brazilian  model  because  of the role of the indexation
system  and its effects  on the supply  side.  On the supply  side, our version of their
model fits the Brazilian  formal  sector quite nicely (and thus the economy  as a whole,
as the informal sector is a residual  in our framework). On the demand  side, we found
that a simple monetarist  demand  for money equation  far outperformed  the M-PS
disaggregated  model of consumption,  investment  and the trade balance, an indication
of the dominance  of monetary  policy in determining  macro outcomes  in Brazil in the
'80s.
Turning first to the supply side, in the M-PS framework  non-financial
profits are written as a markup  on total costs.
(1)  m(WL  + rkw  + ePI)  = (I-t)PY
EIt  was  our  original  intention  to incorporate  a fully  specified  model  of  the  demand  side  in order  to
endogenize  the  interaction  between  the formal  and  informal  sector  and  to incorporate  in  a behavioral  way  the
effect  of correcting  the  government  budget  deficit.  The  difficulty  of modelling  the  real  balance  efft  in a
time  of rising  inflation  and  rising  budget  deficits  precluded  this  approach.  Presented  instead  is  a short  run
model,  calibrated  with  parameter  values  from  the 1980s  which  provides  predictions  for  employment,  real
wages  and  the  division  of factor  income  in the  formal  sector  and,  by extension,  the  level  of  employment  and
output  in agriculture  and  the  informal  sector.-21-
Where P  =  price
m  =  markup
W  =  wage
L  =  labor inputs
Y  =  output
r  =  interest
kw  =  working capital
e  =  exchange rate
I  =  intermediate imports
P*  =  international price
t  = indirect  tax rate.
It is now well known that markup pdicing  is not generally  a profit-maximizing
strategy, at least in a world of perfect foresight  and information,  yet its use is widely
observed. The reason appears to be that it is a good rule of thumb approximation  to
the optimal  price in a world where demand  and input costs fluctuate. In addition,  the
assumption  is quite useful as it permits the disaggregation  of income between  labor
and profit, and shows the effect of changes  in the target wage, the real exchange  rate
and the interest rate, all of which  had an important  influence  on inflation, output, and
the distribution  of income in Brazil.
To help interpret equation  (1)  it is useful to express  it in terms of shares,
by dividing  through  by PY.
(2)  m(WZ+rhv+CP  I  t Py
The first term in the parenthesis  is the real wage times  labor per unit of
output, or the share of labor. The second  is the real interest rate times working capital
per unit of output, or the share of working  capital  in total cost; the last term is the
share of imported  intermediates. This representation  nets out domestc intermediaries,
since the level of analysis is the entire formal sector. What we have therefore is
domestic  value-added  plus the real imported  intermediate  inputs, and equation (2) says
that the share of the three plus profits must add up to one minus the tax rate.  At any
point along the supply  curve we shall  now derive, that must be the case.
The question  for the model  is how the various shares vary with inflation
and output. For simplicity  it is assumed  that neither LJY, kw/Y nor IIY are a- 22 -
function  of Y, each being fixed by technical  factors, but that the markup  is a positive
function  of Y, implying  that business  raises the profits' share as demand  increases." 6
(3)  m  =  m(
It is assumed that both the real interest and the real exchange  rate are exogenous,  and
that the nominal  rates are adjusted  often enough  to make  the real rates invariant with
respect to the level of inflation. But that is not true for the real wage.  It is now well
known that in any system of wage adjustment,  even one with so-caUed  100 percent cx
pot  indexing,  the actual average  level of the real wage is negatively  related to the
inflation  rate.  Even if the full change  in the cost of living is reflected in each wage
adjustment,  the higher the inflation  rate the lower the average  real wage across the
indexing  period will be."  To model the outcome  of the wage setting  process in the
formal sector, it is assumed  that workers enter the bargaining  process with a target
real wage, and that with each wage adjustment  workers are trying to get real wages to
the target wage. The observed  real wage  is the result of this bargaining  process.
Obviously,  a rise in the target wage or an increase  in the number of times wages are
adjusted  would both increase the real wage for a given rate of inflation.
Summarizing,  the real wage is written as a negative  function  of inflation,
a positive function  of both the target wage ju  and the number of times (n) that wages
are readjusted  during the production  period.
(4)  ,p( = w(e, +,  An)
Equation  (4) implies that the labor share  in value added is negatively  related to
inflation. Now, combining  the two assumptions  on the markup  and the labor share:
1 6An  alternative  would  be to make the markup  a function  of excess demand  which would  permit capital
formation  to play a role on the supply side.  In the sbort run, or in an adjustment  recession,  the  formulations
are equivalent  because  capacity  is fixed.
t"Me only way to avoid  this inflation  *Jss would  be for the peak wage itself to be a function  of the level of
inflation,  something  which no indexing  system in Brazil (or anywhere  else that we are aware of) has ever
done.-23 -
+  W(tc)L  + rkw + ePI
(5)  m(')(PY
The labor share and profit share must add up to one less the share of working capital,
imports and taxes.  Equation  (5) describes  the process.  Any rise in output increases
the profit share, which must be accompanied  by an increase  in the inflation  rate
sufficient  to drive the real wage and the labor share down by the necessary  amount.
In other words, the supply curve of the economy  in output-inflation  space is upward
sloping. Rewriting  equation (5) in the form of a supply  curve:
(6)  =  - s(Y,  ,r  ,  ,  n, t)
Equation  (6) is a long run Phillips curve.  Note that it is upward sloping rather than
vertical because  under the indexing assumption  inflation  has a long run effect on the
real wage because  cost of L-ving  wage adjustments  are not instantaneous. The curve
will be steeper  the more often these adjustments  take place and the smaller the share
of labor in total output.
All the other variables  are positive  shifters on the supply  curve.  An
increase in either the real exchange  rate or the interest rate decreases  the share of
value added available  for profits and labor, requiring  either an increase  in the inflation
rate or a reduction  in output to satisfy  equation  (5).  Similarly  an increase in the target
wage shifts the supply  curve up and to the left.  Indeed, if output  is fixed, so
according  to the model is the labor share as with given labor productivity  the share
determines  the necessary  real wage. Worker attempts  to increase  the real wage by
raising the target wage cannot succeed. They only increase  the inflation  rate.  There
are many examples  of this process in Brazil. But shortening  the indexing period
(increasing  n) makes  inflation  less effective  in lowering  the real wage, and as inflation
accelerated  in Brazil, this has been workers' key demand. However, in the limit, with
instantaneous  indexing  the real wage is invariant  with respect  to inflation  and the
economy  supply  curve is vertical.  Thus raising n rotates  the supply  curve counter-
clockwise  and drives up the inflation  rate provided  equilibrium  is at a positive
inflation.
On the demand  side we attempted  without  much success  to fit a
disaggregated  model  which would trace out demand  for formal  and informal sector-24  -
output and show the effect of alternative  government  fiscal  programs on demand.
However, data on the structure of consumption  and the determinants  of savings,
(particularly  inflation  and the deficit), are not very reliable. In addition,  the
tremendous  increase  in government  bonds and money over the period and the large
swings  in velocity associated  with the accelerations  and decelerations in inflation
between 1985-87  made  it almost  impossible  to fit a system  of equations,  as the
structure of the system  seemed  to be changing  yearly, giving very erroneous
predictions  of demand  at the high inflation  rates observed  in 1985 and 1986. We get
a far more accurate  (and simple)  prediction  of aggregate  demand  using a monetarist
model based on the demand  for money. Accordingly  we can write:
(7)  Md IP  2 b(Y,  rl)
The demand  for real balances  is a positive  function  of income and a
negative  function  of the rate of interest. In a high inflation  economy  like Brazil the
cost of holding  cash balances  can be represented  by the irflation rate, replacing  r with
P in equation (7).  It is then useful to rewrite the equation  in terms of elasticities:
(s8) ifi=ete-*  +  X
Where:  ey is the income  elasticity  of the demand  for real balances
ep is the elasticity  of the demand  for real balances  with respect to the
inflation  rate.
Equation  (8) is the Harberger  equation  and it implies that changes  in real balances are
a function  of changes  in real income and changes  in the rate of inflation. Reversing
this equation and solving  for the level of output  provides a demand  curve which
depends  on the inflation  rate (just like the supply  curve), the growth rate of M, and
last year's output.
M  + e f  - I  t
(9)  Y.[  p ey  -aj_-25 -
This demand  curve  has some  unusual  features,  the most  important  of
which  is that  its position  depends  on last  years  output  level, as well  as exogenous
forces  such  as the growth  in M.  Clearly,  for any  level  of Y,. the  demand  curve  is
negatively  related  to inflation. Indeed,  the slope  of the  demand  curve  is
approximately  equal to 1 - ep. We are going  to use equation (9) as the short-run
demand  side of our model.  Holding  the capital  stock and growth constant, in the long
run, the equilibrium  condition  must be that both inflation  and output  are constant  for
any 1M. That implies  that Yt =  Y,., and  7 = 0.  From equation  (9) that implies that
in the long  run M = w, or real balances  must  be constant  regardless  of the values  of
ep  and  ey.
Translating  the above  equations  into  a standard aggregate  supply-
demand  diagram  using  equation  (6) as the supply  curve,  and  equation  (9) as the
demand  curve,  gives:
Figum1
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At any point  in time,  money  growth,  plus  the exogenous  factors  on thS  supply  side,
determine  short-run  equilibrium.  In the  long-run  X must  be equal  to $,  which  is
equivalent  to saying  that on the short-run  demand  curve  at Y,. 1,v = M.  If that  point
happens  to be on the supply  curve, then the economy  is at long-run  equilibrium.-26  -
A
Suppose  that the economy  is in long-run  equilibrium. That means  that M
- X at YO. Now suppose that there is an increase  in  from A,r 0to A,.  In the short
run this shifts  the demand  curve out to D 1. Output  rises to Y1 and inflation  rises, but
not all the way to Al.  The economy  does not immediately  go to the new long run
equilibrium,  which is at the intersection  of  and the supply  curve, point E.  Each
period the short-run  curve shifts out and to the right as income increases. Thus in a
rather curious reversal of the usual Phillips  curve analysis,  here the long-run  Phillips
curve is upward sloping  but not vertical, while the short-run  demand  curve is
downward  sloping and the long-run  demand  curve is horizontal  and determined  by the
growth rate of money. Because  of the negative  relationship  between inflation  and the
real wage money is not neutral in this economy,  even in the long-run.
Applying  the Model  to Brazil
The next step is to use the model to explain  or predict output in the
formal, urban sector. First, estimates of the demand  equation,  a specification  of the
markup  function  (equation  (3)) and a full set of the exogenous  variables that appear in
the supply  and demand  equations  are needed. Armed with all of that, we can calibrate
the model using  data from 1980 through 1987  and compare  its predictions  for the
actual  values of output and inflation. Once the model tracks the 1980s  well, it is used
to: (a) project backward  the effects  of alternative  policy  regimes in the early part of
the decade on output and employment,  and (b) project forward  the effects on the same
variables  of two alternative  policy scenarios,  one in which the fiscal problem  is
resolved  and one in which it is not, resulting  in high inflation  and low growth through
1995.
There is insufficient  data to estimate  a markup  function  for Brazil.
Instead, it is assumed  that the markup  is a log linear function  of output.
Thus we write:
(10)  m  = mY,
Where  a  the elasticity  of the markup  with respect
to output.
The relationship  between  the real wage and inflation  is measured  as the average  of the
target wage at the beginning  of the indexing  period and the real wage at the end of the
period; or
P  2  1.i-27  -
We combine  equations (5, 10-11)  to get an expression  for the supply  curve, and then
combine this expression  with equation  (9) to get equilibrium  output and inflation.
Note that our solutions  are short run.
(12)  Y=(  1 -t
m[lg(2  + it)  /2(1  + u)]  +  rk/P + ep4/P
Where 1  = L/Y  - labor/output
k  = kw/Y - working  capital/output
i  = I/Y  - imports/output.
Equation  (12) is a relatively  steep supply  curve and equation  (9) a
relatively  flat demand  curve.  Wages are affected  by inflation,  but the effect is fairly
small given the small share of labor in output  and the switch  to twice-a-year  indexing
in 1980 when our sample starts.  This has the important  implication  that the real level
of output is primarily  determined  on the supply  side, by shifts  in exogenous  supply-
side variables  such as the target wage, the real interest rate or labor producdvity.
Inflation  is then largely determined  by the growth in money.
The parameters  used to estimate  the model are described  in the
Appendix. Table 10 displays  the model's predictions  and observed  values for output
and inflation. Note that the inflation  rate is derived from the national  accounts  series
for the real and nominal values of output  for services  plus industry. The model with
the variable markup does extremely  well in tracking output, as of course it should,
given the way the markup was constructed. A measure  of the model's performance  is
how much the markup had to vary to track output. In our estimate, m has a 10
percent variation from 1980 to 1987,  the bulk of which occurred  in 1987  when price
controls and mildly  contractionary  macroeconomic  policy limited  business  ability to
pass along cost increases, particularly  wages and interest. It is clear that more work
could be done on the markup equation,  but it does appear to reproduce  trends in
output and the real wage well enough to serve for forecasting  purposes.-28-
TBLE  10: PREDICTED  AND  ACTUAL  VALUES.  FORMAL  SECTOR
Infation  Outnu
(peret0)  (1980z1)
Pediced  AnWa  Prdicd  Actul
1980  92  92  1.000  1.000
1981  llS  113  0.934  0.935
1982  77  107  0.936  0.938
1983  146  145  0.901  0.901
1984  277  216  0.919  0.919
198S  284  228  0.969  0.970
1986  163  121  1.112  1.112
1987  171  24S  1.070  1.076
As for the demand side, the estimated Harberger equation performs reasonably
well, particularly in the early years before the acceleration of inflation and the wage and
price  freeze in  1986 shocked the system and shifted the demand curve.  It overforecasts
inflation coming out of the 1983 recession when M2 was growing far faster than prices, but
then  the actual price index catches up with our predicted price  in  1987 when the effects of
repressed inflation pushed the inflat.on rate far above the expansion in the money supply.
Although velocity has increased steadily over the period (and by 55 percent since 1973) all
velocity measures have behaved erratically in recent years-dropping  sharply in 1986 and
nsing sitaply  in  1987-both  movements being more than can be explained by changes in the
inflation rate.
What if Brazil Had Successfully Adjusted in the Early 1980s?
Having achieved a reasonable fit of the model with the actual data, we can now
address more formally the question of the costs of Brazil's failure to adjust in the 1980s.  We
start by simulating alternative policies and outcomes in the early part of the decade.  A note
of caution is in order,  however.  The ret  on that the Harberger equation fits the 1980s so
well is partly the dominance of monetary phenomena on the demand side.  That is, the
explosion in the internal debt and its financing swamped the effects of any other changes on
the expenditure side.  Had Brazil instead effected a fiscal adjustment in the early eighties,
other demand side effects might have been more important and possibly more measurable in
our modelling exercise.
Our first simulation looks at the tradeoff between monetary and fiscal policy in
the first half of the decade on output and employment.  As a result of Brazil's tight  money
and loose fiscal policies, interest costs rose by 53 percent between 1980 and 1985.  This  had
an unfavorable and perverse effect on employment, output and the distribution of income.
To see how large this interest rate effect was, we ran a counterfactual simulation in which
we kept the interest cost at its 1980 level through 1985.  Since this increased the level of
output, we adjusted the labor productivity parameter to eliminate stockpiling for those years-29 -
n which output  rose above its 1980  level. Our simulation  results show that had Brazil
curtailed  public spending  sufficiently  to keep interest rates at their 1980 level, by 1985,
output would have been 15.5 percent higher, while formal sector labor employment and
ncome would both have been 7.5 percent higher.  The big gainer would have been non-
nancial  profits which would have risen by 16 percent due both to lower interest costs and
higher labor productivity. These results are achieved  by reducing  the depth of the private
sector recession. The counterfactual  thus makes  clear the payoff  to a stabilization  policy mix
,at depends  more on fiscal and less on monetary  policy. Note that our simulation  does not
nclude the possible output cost that such a fiscal contraction  might  have entailed, as our
emand  side does not include these variables. It is also fairly clear from the history of the
decade that the fiscal contraction was not tenable  politically  in 1981-83.
We also ran a simulation  to see the effect of rising target wage demands  on
output and employment. As we pointed  out above, a rise in real wages and the labor share
were a signficant feature of the period up to 1983 and 1986-87. What would have happened
had the target wage stayed at its 1980  level through 1987? As in the interest rate simulation
we adjusted  the labor productivity  parameter  to eliminate  stockpiling  in those years when
output exceeded  its 1980 level.  We also  et the markup  parameter at its 1981  value.
Holding wages down has a significant  effect on output, but little effect on employment
during the 1981-83  recession. Output  in 1983, instead of being 10 percent below its 1980
level, is only 1.7 percent below, but employment  is virtually  unchanged  because  of
stockpiling. In the subsequent  recovery,  through 1986, the counterfactual  output and
employment  are both about 5 percent higher than what was observed. Thus holding  down
wage demands  sharply reduces the recessionary  effect of stabilization,  and also permits an
increase in employment  during the 1985-86  recovery. But despite  the higher level of real
income and employment,  formal sector  labor is worse off in the counterfactual  world  because
the decline  in the labor share is so pronounced  that it more than offsets whatever  increase
there is in employment. Holding down wage  demands  transfers income to profits, but labor
real income stays roughly constant  at its 1980  level except in 1986,  whereas it increased
substantially  in the historical simulation,  even in the 1981-83  recession. In addition,  the
politic.i viability  of this alternative  policy  regime is suspect  as well, as by 1981  labor union
fedeations had formed and the political  opening  was already underway.
Evaluation  of Brazil's Policy Qptions  for the 1990s
As Brazil's macroeconomic  environment  is extremely  unstable  at present,
predicting  Brazil's future growth path is complicated. Clearly, Brazil could not have
continued  along its 1989 path, as a hyperinflation  with ensuing  economic  disorganization
would eventually  ensue.  Brazil could be seen as having two choices. The first would  be to
finally effect the required adjustment,  structurally  adjusting  public consumption  to levels
consistent  with minimal  private sector  transfers. This would allow a resurgence  in private
sector investment,  stimulating  economic  growth, reversing the downward  trend in labor
productivity,  and allowing increased  employment  and real wages. The second would  be to- 30-
only partially effect the adjustment-just  enough to stabilize  the economy  and avert
hyperinflation. Some scaling  back of public consumption,  effectively  stabilizing  the growt
of the internal debt, might allow the economy  to continue  to generate  positive  growth (zero
on a per capita basis) for a few years, until the political  consensus  for a more ambitious
adjustment  program was reached." 8 Obviously,  either of these future growth paths, (or
several alternatives  in between)  can also be reached  through  the detour of hyperinflation.
However, our model is not very helpful in analyzing  this phenomenon. The purpose of t;
analysis  is to illuminate  the implications  of a continued  failure to adjust  public consumption
the poor, and the two scenarios  sketched  out above  serve this purpose well.  The first enters
Brazil on a virtuous course of relatively  low inflatic  and high growth, the second enters
Brazil into a vicious circle of inflation and slow growth.
To estimate  the impact of alternative  macroeconomic  scenarios  on labor markei
outcomes  and poverty in Brazil, a four-step  procedure  was followed. First, using a
macroeconomic  accounting  framework  to ensure consistency,  growth rates of sectoral
outputs, savings,  investment,  and the external balance  were estimated,  conforming  to the
normative  policy scenarios  sketched  out above. Then, using estimates  plus norms of
inflation  and interest rates for each scenario, we used a behavioral  model of portfolio balanci
(e.g demand  for money and bonds) to estimate  a financeable  government  deficit and the
government  interest bill (including  external financing)  for each case. 19 Third, using this
estimate  of the financeable  deficit and the interest bill, the policy measures  required to
produce a set of government  accounts (consumption,  investment)  consistent  with our
aggregate  macro projection  were estimated. In the final step, we plugged the estimates  from
the previous three steps into the model described  above  and (a) checked  again for
consistency,  making minor modifications  where  justified, and (b) estimated  the results of the
stabilization  and growth  processes  simulated  in steps 1-3 on the functional  distribution  of
income under each scenario. The parameter estimates  are shown  in the Data Appendix;  we
describe the results of this process and the implications  for poverty  below.
The first scenario (the high case) is a highly normative  scenario, implying  a
high degree of consensus  among  policymakers  (legislative,  executive  and judiciary) and
economic  sectors on a stabilization  course.  It assumes  that immediately  following  the
elections, Brazil begins an adjustment  program consisting  of an incomes  policy (wage and
price controls)  and structural adjustment  in fiscal accounts. Subsidies  are reduced  by 6
percent in the first year, and more rapidly thereafter,  as are transfers to the social security
and health system. Government  employment  is reduced  slightly  (or wages are cut), as are
"Alternatively,  Brazil could  continue  to experience  stop-go  cycles  of stabiliation and recession  followed  by a
return to growth as the government  loosens its purse strings, with growth  each time choked  off by a lack of
investment,  thus in return of inflation  again. On average, this scenario  would look the same as a low-growth
scenario.
1TIhis  model is described  in Coutinho,  1989.- 31 -
purchases of goods and services.  Public confidence  is high, velocity  of money  declines
dramatically, and tax collections  return to their historical  levels. Real interest rates fall
significantly,  as the government  is no longer forced to pay high rates to finance the debt.  A
debt reduction reduces  required interest payments  by about .5 percent of GDP, aiding  in the
fiscal adjustment. After the stabilization,  the government  also initiates  major sectoral
adjustments,  including  privatization,  trade reform, and deregulation,  improving  the efficiency
of the economy.
TABLE 1:  BRAZIL  - PREDICTED  HIGH CASE OUTCOMES
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  199S
mal Sector
I Wages  1.00  0.986  0.977  0.987  1.025  1.056  1.090  1.127
-loyment  1.00  0.961  0.969  0.983  1.010  1.048  1.091  1.125
or Income  1.00  0.943  0.940  0.965  1.032  1.099  1.188  1.262
fit Income  1.00  1.071  1.032  1.029  1.064  1.120  1.181  1.252
on-Financial
Profit Income  1.00  1.094  1.055  1.090  1.150  1.234  1.300  1.378
nnal Sector
loyment  1.00  1.181  1.262  1.335  1.395  1.439  1.477  1.535
The predic ed result of these policy measures  on output growth in our
normative  high scenario is highly positive after a short adjustment  period.'  By
1992, Brazil returns to 5 percent growth  per annum  under a strong resurgence of
private investment  and could continue  along this path through  the decade, in the
absence of any major shocks. Table 11 shows  what happens  to income and
employment  in both the formal and informal  sectors. Note that informal sector
employment  is treated as a residual here.  Starting with the formal  sector, the return
to rapid growth by 1992  permits a significant  increase  in the real wage labor income
and employment. In our simulations  we assumed  formal sector productivity  growth of
2.3 percent per year, slightly  less than the 2.7 percent rate observed  during the 1970s,
because of the lower overall growth rate.  We also assumed  that both labor and capital
shared the benefit of lower real interest rates through a slight rise in the share of each
factor.  Employment,  which was sluggish  throughout  the 1980s, grows at an average
of 3 percent from 1990-95  while real wages grow by 2.9 percent and labor incomes
by 6.1 percent. This split of the growth dividend  permits non-financial  profits to grow
by 30.5 percent over the same period, supporting  the necessary  increase in private
investment.
'Note that this scenario  implies  very low  costs  of adjustment,  with  only  about  18 months  of recession.  Given
Brazil's  recent  history  of failed  stabilization  policies,  such  a scenario  may  be too optimistic.- 32 -
Turning to the informal  sector, where the bulk of the poor derives
incomes, this sector will still be forced to absorb  rural workers even in the high
growth scenario  because agricultural  employment  is roughly  constant. 21 A good
fraction  of that increase occurs during the adjustment  period, but even in the 1990-95
period informal  sector employment  must grow at 4 percent per year.  This does not
imply that rapid growth will not have a significant  impact on poverty.  On the
contrary, since average output in the informal sector  is growing even faster than the
labor force, average informal wages should  increase,  especially  if the 1990s  are like
the 1980s  in which periods of growth  led to a narrowing  in the formal/informal  wage
differential. In addition, our assumed  3.5 percent productivity  growth in agriculture
should  permit some increase in wages  there as well.  Nevertheless,  the implied  growth
in the informal sector in the high scenario  only underlines  the point that 5 percent
growth in Brazil must be near the minimum  at which significant  progress can be made
in reducing  poverty through formal sector  employment  growth alone.
The second scenario  (the low case) shows  a much less rosy outcome. A
stabilization  program, again consisting  of incomes  policy and fiscal reduction,  is
initiated  in 1990, which averts hyperinflation. However,  the fiscal reduction  is not
sufficient,  and a high real interest rate policy must be maintained  in order to finance
the deficit. In a vicious circle, failure to raise taxes and lower government
expenditures  makes it impossible  to control monetary  expansion. As a result the
economy  suffers with two vicious circles. First, deficits  financed by bond sales force
up the real interest rate, which remains at high levels exacerbating  the deficit problem.
Second,  because  of the continuation  of inflation, it is not possible to lengthen  the
indexing  period and Brazil enters into a fruitless struggle  between  labor and capital
over the distribution  of slowly  growing formal  sector output--a  struggle resolved
through  high inflation.
2'We  assume  agricultural  productivity  growth  of 3.5 percent  per year,  somewhat  lower  than  the rate  observei
in the  '70s, when  the agricultural  labor  force  fell by 3 percent  over  the decade,  or .3 percent  per year,  whil
output  was  rising  by 4.8 percent  per year.- 33 -
TABLE 12:  BRAZIL  - PREDICTED  LOW CASE OUTCOMES
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
onna  Sctor
cal Wages  1.00  0.986  0.996  0.990  1.00  1.00  1.010  1.019
Employment  1.00  0.961  0.968  0.979  0.987  0.999  1.006  1.018
Labor Income  1.00  0.943  0.961  0.968  0.982  0.993  1.014  1.032
Profit Income  1.00  1.071  1.063  1.084  1.010  1.120  1.137  1.157
Non-Finncial
Profit Income  1.00  1.094  1.088  1.109  1.123  1 144  1.162  1.181
nforinal Sector
mployment  1.00  1.181  1.242  1.264  1.342  1.432  1.522  1.710
In the low scenario we have set formal  sector growth at 1.85  percent per
year.  Tables 12 shows the deleterious  effect of this on all participants  in the
economy. Even though we keep the labor share  constant, the real wage only grows
by .5 percent per year here and labor incomes  expand  by only 7.4 percent during
1990-1995,  compared  to 35 percent in the high scenario. The growth in profits is
equally modest. The big impact of slow growth is seen in the informal sector because
it is the residual employer. One percent growth in the formal sector means that it
only absorbs about 250,000 new entrants per year.  But with agriculture  not absorbing
labor, the informal  sector must expand by about 1.5 milion per year (7.7 percent
growth).  By 1995 there will be about 3 million  more workers in the informal  sector
in the low than in the high scenario, underlining  the key role that growth plays in
creating  good rather than marginal  jobs.  Average  value added  per worker declines in
the informal  sector, which undoubtedly  implies  a falling real wage and an increase in
the formal/informal  wage differential,  just exactly  what has already been happening
between 1986 and 1989.
In this case, the unconvincing  stabilization  has a high cost.  Failing to
eliminate  the deficit, the government  is forced into a high-interest,  high-inflation,  low-
investment,  low-growth  trajectory.  Formal sector growth is insufficient  to absorb
rural-urban  migrants  and new entrants.  Real wages  are roughly  constant in the formal
sector, and poverty increases  in the rapidly expanding  informal  sector.
Conclusions
From a macroeconomic  standpoint,  Brazil solved half of the adjustment
problem it and other high debt countries faced in the 1980s  - the need for balance  of
payments surpluses  to service the external debt.  However, Brazil failed to cut from
consumption  the domestic  counterpart of the increased  foreign interest burden,
preferring to reduce investment  instead.  Government  consumption  was financed  by- 34 -
extracting  resources from the private sector through  deficit financing  and inflation.
As the deficit grew, the government  was increasingly  forced to pay high rates of
interest to extract these resources. While these policies  clearly helped  to maintain
consumption  levels and thus prevent an increase in poverty, they had high costs in
terms of Brazil's future, as they resulted  in declining  investment  in the private sector
and increasing  capital flight. By 1987, the distributional  costs of these policies  were
higher than the income gains, resulting  in a widening  of the income gap.
Private formal sector output growth is clearly necessary  for poverty
alleviation  in Brazil.  Virtually  all of the net increase  in poverty took place during the
recession  of 1981-83,  when formal  sector output declined  15 percent. An important
factor in that output decline was Brazil's reliance  on tight money  policies, which
choked  off investment  and cut non-financial  profits, instead  of fiscal adjustment. Our
counterfactual  simulations  suggest  that Brazil could have achieved  a much better
poverty  performance  :n the '80s if it had been able to reach political agreement  on a
reduced  level of consumption  in either 1982-83,  or in 1985 (either by reducing
government  expenditures  or increasing  taxes, thus reducing  private consumption).
This was very difficult, as the loosening  of authoritarian  controls  gave voice and
power to new groups, bringing  a rush of pent-up  demand  for consumption,  especially
government  services.  Ironically,  the failure to exercise  restraint in the early and
middle  years of the decade compromised  growth for the rest of the decade, hurting all
groups.
Our review of the macroeconomic  record shows  that Brazil's wage
policies  in the '80s strongly  benefitted  formal sector  workers, especially  during the
recession. In this Brazil's experience  differs quite sharply from many other countries
during stabilization. Furthermore,  during the recession,  private sector firms did not
reduce  employment  as fast as output  declined, choosing  instead  to stockpile  labor and
sacrifice  profits.  While the direct effects  of these policies  should not be particularly
pro-poor (as most poor households  do not receive  earnings  from this sector), the
indirect  effects (the income multiplier  effects) appear  to have been strong enough to
have prevented  real incomes  in the informal sector (including  agriculture)  from falling
relative to the formal sector.  Had the government  not tried to protect the wages of
lower-skilled  private sector workers, firms would most likely not have increased
employment,  but rather increased  profits.  When private formal sector output  did
increase in 1983-86,  employment  increased  pal  p=u.
Government  sector wage and employment  policies  do seem to have been
ill-advised  from a poverty point of view.  During the recession, these policies  helped
to maintain  formal sector employment,  albeit at lower wages.  We could not estimate
the cost of these policies  in terms of forgone  output in the private sector (caused  by
the deficit financing),  nor does our data allow us to estimate  how many of these  jobs
went to poor households  or near-poor  households. Thus we cannot  asses their net-35  -
impact during the recession,  but owing  in part to the wage compression,  we suspect
that their negative  impact on poverty via an increased  deficit during these years was
low.  However, as government  salaries  began to recover in the middle  years of the
decade and employment  kept increasing,  personnel  costs at all levels of government
became an important  expenditure  item, rising 30 percent in real terms between 1985
and 1988 to almost  9 percent of GDP.  Financing  these expenditures  must have had an
output cost over the same period.  In addition,  as government  employees  with 5 years
of service or more were given permanent  tenure under the new constitution,  the
government's generosity  during these years is likely to take its toll in the 1990s  as
well.
Our scenarios of growth and adjustment  in the '90s suggest  that Brazil
can still stabilize  and return to a sustainable  growth path in the next decade, and that
such a course would bring about significant  poverty reduction. The trick to entrance
on this virtuous course is for all groups (including  the poor) to suffer a short-run  loss.
The loss would only be short run if the stabilization is effective within a very short
time and investor confidence  brings a resurgence  of private investment. Then,
repeating the pattern of the '70s in more sustainable  fashion, output increases  in the
private formal sector would translate  into higher employment  and earnings  in the
higher paid formal sector and higher earnings  in the informal sector where the poor
earn the bulk of their income. Ironically  again, entrance on this course would  permit
government  consumption  to reach its highest  absolute  level ever without  resorting to
inflation, allowing  the option of addressing  Brazil's long list of social needs, including
improving  access to social services among  the poor.
A repeat of the stabilization  failures  of 1986-89,  on the other hand,
brings grim prospects for the poor.  The government  would be forced  to continue  a
high interest rate policy and an expansionist  monetary  policy in a fruitless  effort to
maintain  government  consumption,  which continues  to decline  over the decade.
Investment  remains flat, and stagnation  in the formal sector crowds  workers into the
informal sector, lowering earnings  in this sector. No expansion  of social services is
possible, and living standards of the poor deteriorate.
This analysis of the prospects  for poverty reduction  has focused  on an
aggregate  analysis  of the country as a whole. Our prediction  of the prospects  for
poverty reduction  depend on the mechanism  of expansion  of the private formal sector.
In the '70s (and again in the period 1984-85),  output  growth in this sector brought
both formal sector employment  growth (higher  paying  jobs) and increased  incomes  in
the informal sector through strong linkage  effects. We noted above  that this
mechanism  worked much better in the more developed  southern areas of the country,
where the degree of formalization  is much greater and the share of the private sector
employment  in total formal sector employment  is mruch  greater.  While we do expect
that if the scenario  of stabilization,  adjustment  and growth materializes  the Northeast-36-
will  benefit,  we are much  less  confident  about  the magnitude  of the  benefit  there  than
in the southern  aeas.  The stabilizadon  pedod  will  be especialy  difficult  for the
major  cities  in the Northeast,  as this  period  implies  a reduction  in either  employment
or wages  in the public  administration  sector  or both,  and  thus  the recovery  may  take
longer  to bring  poverty  reduction  benefits  to these  areas. Achieving  reductions  in
poverty  in this less  developed  area  will  clearly  require  policies  that make  growth  more
efficient  at poverty  reduction-in  other  words,  improve  the  rate of triclde  dowvn.- 37 -
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DATA APPENDIX
NQtes  to Tables
Table 2.  The macro indicators  (fiscal  policy, savings  and investment)  are
from Brazil national accounts data.  The 1987 numbers are the preliminary estimates.
The estimates  of formal and informal sector output  were obtained  as follows. First, we
defined earners in the formal sector as those contributing  to the social security system
(Previdencia). Using  the distribution  of earnings  from the mnain  job for these two groups
reported in the household  survey data (PNAD), we calculated mean earnings for each
group for each year, and the differential  in mean  earnings  for each year. This differential
is  reported in  Table 5.  The  formal share  of  total output was then  1-(l-d)/(l-
d+d(differential)) where d is the share of the labor force in the formal sector.  We
calculated  the differential between  the informal and the agricultural  sector in the same
way except that here we used the average income of both contributors and non-
corributors, since the bulk of agricultural  labor does not contribute  to social security.
Table 3.  These numbers are compiled from special tabulations of the
PNAD survey  prepared  by IBGE for Nelson  do Valle  Silva. Dr. Silva generously  made
these tabulations  available  to us.
Table  4.  Published  tabulations  of the distribution  of per capita  income are
only available  for selected  years, and are found in the IBGE  series, Maes and Criancas.
Income is reported in minimum  salaries (after 1986, the pisg nationD.  Our constant
poverty  line was obtained  by (a) converting  minimum  salaries  for the reference month  for
each year into constant cruzados; and the (b) converting  this value into constant 1980
minimum  salaries  (e.g. correcting  for changes  in the real minimum  wage). As the survey
reference  period often spanned  a period of minimum  salary change, we had to choose  a
reference  month. In these cases, we chose  the reference  month  identified  by IBGE in the
published  tabulations  of the PNAD data. Table A-i shows  this calculation.-40  -
TABLE A-1:  REAL MlNIMUM  WAGE INDEX  FOR PNAD. CENSUS  DATA
Survey Ref.  Index Ref.  Nominal  Value  INPC  Real Value  Index  Poverty Line,
Period  Period  (CZ$)  (3/86=100)  (Cz$)  per Capita  M
1/8 - 31/8  1980  (average)  4.02  0.48  8.37  1.00  0.2S0
11/8  11/14  11/981  8.46  1.15  735  0.88  0.284
9/19-  12/11  11/1982  23.57  2.38  9.90  1.18
9/2s  1/10  911983  34.78  S.S8  6.23  0.74  0.337
9123  - 9/29  9/1984  97.18  16.24  S.98  0.71
9/22 - 9/28  9/1985  333.10  S1.42  6.48  0.77  0.323
9(28- 10/4  9/1986  804.00  106.1S  7.57  0.90  0.276
9/27 - 10/3  9/1987  2,400.00  406.24  5.91  0.71  0.352
The income distribution data, mean household income per capita, and poverty gap are our
own calculations, based on  special tabulations of the PNAP survcy data prepared by
INPES/IPEA.  The methodology is described in Fox (1990).
Table S.  The first four employment indices are taken from PNAD and
census data as reported in Cacciamali (1989).  The formal sector is taken to be those
contributing to  the national social security system, a  more inclusive concept than the
alternative, workers with a signed worker card.  The RAIS index numbers are from the
Ministry of  Labor,  where  a fixed panel of  establishments was used  to  calculate the
indices.  In these data, "public sector' refers to public administration workers only.  The
PME and FIESP numbers are widely avalable;  our source was CoiucWa  Eonomica.
The  real  average  income  indices  and  differentials  are  the  same  ones  used  in  the
calculations for Table 2.
Tables  6i9.  Value  added  per  worker  is  derived  from  the  output and
employment data whose indices are displayed in Tables 2 and 5.  To derive an estimated
of factor shares we used the definition of the labor share as WLJPQ, using the observed
level of productivity in the formal sector, and the observed average FIESP industrial real
wage as reported in Table 2.  Financial profit is defined as the share of interest costs
(measurement described below), and we then obtained the non-financial profit share as
a residual after all other costs (taxes, imports) were subtracted.  The indices of factor
incomes are the product of the indices of factor shares and an index of total output which
include finance, taxes, and imported inputs in addition to value added.  Our estimates,
year by year, are shown below.- 41 -
TABL&  A-2:  VALUE ADDED PER  WORKER. FACTOR SHARES AND FACTOR INCOMES
19lu  1m1  1925  1983  1984  198S  1986  198?
Value  Added oer
ToWa  1.00  0.96  0.92  0.91  0.90  0.92  0.96  0,96
Agriculwe  1.00  1.13  1.05  1.13  1.02  1.11  1.10  1.27
Formua  1.00  0.92  0.91  0.87  0.88  0.89  0.95  0.88
Informua  1.00  0.88  0.81  0.75  0.83  0.89  1.05  0.90
Index of Factor  Shares
Labor Share  1.00  1.16  1.25  1.19  1.09  1.16  1.23  1.20
Profit Sham  1.00  0.85  0.82  0.84  0.9*  0.91  0.98  0.92
Non-Funancial
Profit Sharm  1.00  0.77  0.73  0.75  0.85  0.81  1.02  0.83
index of Factor Incomes
Labor (fornnu only)  1.00  1.09  1.17  1.07  1.00  1.12  1.37  1.29
Pofit  1.00  0.86  0.83  0.82  0.91  0.95  1.06  1.06
Non-Fuminabl
Profit  1.00  0.80  0.77  0.76  0.86  0.88  1.09  0.99
Esimation  of the model
Values  of exogenous  parameters  are shown  below  in Table A-3.  These
values were obtained from published  data, obserwed  values for tax collections,  labor
productivity,  working  capital  and impors were obtained. These  were converted  to shares  of
observed  value-added  plus imports,  giving  observed  values  for t, 1, rk/p, and eP*i/P  for the
period  1980-87.  The target  wage  was  more  difficult  because  of Brazil's  staggered  system  of
wage  setting.  In fact,  a certain  fraction  of the  labor  force  has  their  semi-annual  adjustment  each
month,  so there  is no single  target  wage,  and the  value  of the Sao  Paulo  industrial  wage  index
(Table  5) in year t-l, deflated  by the National  Consumer  Price index (NPC), was used to
approximate  the target  wage.- 42 -
TABLE  A-3: VALUES  OE EXOGENOUS  PARAMETERS
Labor Share  Target Wage  Taxes  IMpot Sharc  Real Interest  Money  Supply  Indexing  Markup
% of Output  Index  Growth  (%)  Period
LJQ  u  t  CP*iIP  rk/p  M 2 n  m
1980  0.283  0.976  0.114  0.099  0.066  0.87  2.00  2.197
1981  0.308  1.000  0.125  0.093  0.092  1.05  2.00  2.140
1982  0.310  1.070  0.131  0.084  0.090  0.83  2.00  2.025
1983  0.318  1.140  0.127  0.088  0.088  1.35  2.00  2.075
1984  0.312  1.060  0.115  0.082  0.095  2.65  3.00  2.185
1985  0.313  0.990  0.118  0.065  0.101  2.90  3.00  2.180
1986  0.298  1.050  0.135  0.046  0.050  1.8S  3.00  2.080
1987  0.314  1.050  0.126  0.047  0.097  1.67  2.00  1.970
Determining  an appropriate  value  for interest  costs was also difficult. TheoreticaUi
the right value should be the real cost of working capital, whether or not it is financed b'
outside  borrowing. This value  is not reported  or observed  in Brazil. Two options  are available.
First, there is the real interest cost of borrowed  working capital as reported by the bankin
system. That is a small  amount,  less than one percent of total formal sector  cost of productio
A second estimate can be derived from corporate income statements found in Cnjmuri
Economica,  which report nominal  interest costs including  monetary correction.  Even when
deflated,  they are a very large proportion  of gross profits, over 60 percent in the high interes
years of 1981-83. This estimate  surely overstates  true interest costs because  it ignores gains
from the reduction in the real value of outstanding  debt due to inflation. As our estimate  we
chose a third alternative, which stands between  these two.  It is the real imputed  value of the
services  of financial  intermediaries,  adjusted  for the share  of government  bonds  in bank asse
This estimate understates interest costs to the extent that it leaves out interest payments
deposits  as well as required reserves. But it also includes  an element  of overstatement  to the
extent that banks lend outside  the formal  sector to either consumers  or to agriculture. All three
series  have the same  pattern over the 1980s-rising  from 1980-1985,  falling  sharply  in 1986  an
returning  to a high level in 1987 and 1988.
We started our system in 1980  where we had census observations  of the labor an(
capital  share in services, commerce  and industry. Using the observed  value of the real wa
and the inflation  rate, we were then able  to normalize  our labor productivity  measures  and oul
markup  so that we got exactly  the observed  labor share, and real wage at the observed  level o
output and inflation.  We then experimented  with a range of different values of the marku
elasticity parameter, finally choosing  the value 1.2.  This choice caused us some difficu
because  it became  clear by inspection  that because  of very large fluctuations  in the supply  sidi
exogenous  variables,  particularly  the target wage and the interest rate, the model would  pred
a deeper downturn in  1983 than actually occurred and then a far  more rapid subsequen- 43 -
expansion  in 1984-86. The markup equation  clearly needs more work.  But since we do not
iave the data to properly test alternative  specifications,  and since we have a good idea of what
e labor share must have been from our labor productivity  and real wage series, we adjusted
ie markup  parameter (m) downward  in the deep  recession of 1983  and upward to compensate
the subsequent  years.  This is equivalent  to saying  that the markup  is more sensitive  to the
evel of  output than is implied in our elasticity parameter a.  The values for n  reflect
overnment  wage  policy and private sector  practice.
Turning to the demand  equation,  we used  M2 as our dependent  variable  and estimated
ie equation using  yearly data from 1973  through  1987. Given  the rising pattern of inflation  in
razil, there is a high degree of multi-collinearity  between  income and the inflation  rate.  To
avoid that problem we set the incoltie elasticity  at one and re-estimated  the equation, which
came a regression  of velocity on the inflation  rate.  The resulting  equation  was:
ln M/P = -. 48 + lnY - ISP
(-58.0)  (-4.59)
adj R=  .59
D.W.  =  1.09
mulation  parameters
Table A-4 shows the simulation  parameters  used to estimate  the high and low case
outcomes  in the simulation  exercise. To derive the formal  sector labor share, in the high case,
we assumed  an increasing  productivity  trend  over the period 1991-1995,  with an average  of 2.3
xercent  per annum. In the low case, we assumed  a 1 percent productivity  increase. Using  these
assumptions,  we derived l/Q (labor  per unit of output), and formal  sector  employment  growth.
In both cases, we assumed  no growth in agricultural  employment  (e.g labor productivity  grows
the same  rate as output  in agriculture,  3.5 percent  per annum). In agriculture,  this represents
continuation  of the trends of the 80s.  From  these assumptions,  the growth of employment  in
ie informal sector was a residual (holding  the unemployment  rate constant  at the 1987 share
of the labor force).44-
:: 
GDP Growth  rate  4.3  1.0  1.0  2.8  5.0  6.0  6.0  6.0
(paxxemtiq  of GDP)
Currnat  Aoount  Elano  1.2  0.3  4.4  4.6  4.9  .0.9  0.9  40.4
Conumpion  77.9  77.5  78.9  76.6  7S.8  74.2  73.4  75.2
bnvest-mat  17.0  18.0  18.0  21.0  22.0  24.0  25.0  25.0
Gov't Account (Cosolidats
Revenus  24.4  24.1  2S.0  26.6  25.7  25.4  25.2  25.0
Curen  31.0  24.8  23.7  22.2  213  20.6  20.3  20.1
Capial  3.2  2.7  2.8  3.0  3.4  3.8  4.0  4.0
Deficit FPinon*r.  - - 2.0  .1.0  1.7  2.3  2.S  2.5
EbXernl  - - 0.4  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.4
Money  - - 1.1  2.8  2.6  1.9  1.8  1.8
Pondb  - - 0.5  -4.4  -1.7  -0.3  0.2  0.3
Other  Ierno (%)
Ratl Domesic heave  Rat  20.5  12.0  10.0  10.0  10.0  10.0  10.0
InDato  Rut  (Doc.4-Dm.) 935.0  1300.0  600.0  80.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
No. of blde2dg Pedods  4.0  4.0  4.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0
Tauxs (t)  0.140  0.118  0.14  0.153  .153  0.153  0.153  Q1.,3
Inteestyd  Coa  (wIp  0.097  0.094  0.090  0.070  0.060  0.050  0.050  0.050
Iptnt  Shae  (SP%Up)  0.046  0.048  O.0S4  0.057  0.059  0.061  0.063  0.0e3- 45 -
LOW  CASE
GDP Growth  rate  *0.3  1.0  1.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0
(peontage  of GDP)
Curfent  Account  Balance  1.2  0.3  -0.4  *0.4  40.7  -0.8  -0.7  -0.6
Consluvpion  77.9  77.5  80.0  80.4  80.6  80.8  80.9  80.8
nvnetmeat  17.0  18.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0
Gov't Accounts  (Consoidatd)
Reaeues  24.4  24.1  22.5  22.5  22.2  22.1  22.1  22.1
Curret  31.0  24.8  22.6  22.2  22.0  22.0  22.0  22.2
Capitl  3.2  2.7  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0
Deficit  Financing:  - - 2.1  -1.5  1.8  2.0  1.9  1.8
External  - - 0.6  0.8  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.7
Money  - - 0.9  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9
Bonds  - - 0.7  -0.3  -0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3
Other  Items (%)
Rel  Domestic  Intetst  Rate  20.5  17.8  17.8  17.8  17.8  178  17.8
Infiation  Rate (Dec.-Doc.)  935.0  1300.0  800.0  800.0  800.0  800.0  800.0  800.0
No. of  Fbsingpedods 4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0
Taxes (t)  0.140  0.118  0.118  0.118  0.118  0.118  0.118  0.118
mene  Cost  (drkp)  0.097  0.094  0.092  0.092  O.092  0.092  0.092  0.092
mpozt  Share (ePNIp)  0.046  0.048  O.OS4  0.057  0.059  0.061  0.063  0.063PRE  Working  Papgr  SAries
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